Abstract-The impact of citizen journalism raises important video integrity and credibility issues. In this article, we introduce Vamos, the first user transparent video "liveness" verification solution based on video motion, that accommodates the full range of camera movements, and supports videos of arbitrary length. Vamos uses the agreement between video motion and camera movement to corroborate the video authenticity. Vamos can be integrated into any mobile video capture application without requiring special user training. We develop novel attacks that target liveness verification solutions. The attacks leverage both fully automated algorithms and trained human experts. We introduce the concept of video motion categories to annotate the camera and user motion characteristics of arbitrary videos. We show that the performance of Vamos depends on the video motion category. Even though Vamos uses motion as a basis for verification, we observe a surprising and seemingly counter-intuitive resilience against attacks performed on relatively "stationary" video chunks, which turn out to contain hard-to-imitate involuntary movements. We show that overall the accuracy of Vamos on the task of verifying whole length videos exceeds 93 percent against the new attacks.
Ç

INTRODUCTION
T HE citizen journalism revolution, enabled by advances in mobile and social technologies, transforms information consumers into collectors and disseminators of news. Major news outlets have started to fill out professional journalistic gaps with videos shot on mobile devices. Examples range from videos of conflicts in areas with limited professional journalism representation (e.g., Syria, Ukraine) to spontaneous events (e.g., tsunamis, earthquakes, meteorite landings, authority abuse). Such videos are often distributed through sites such as CNN's iReport [1] , NBC's Stringwire [2] and CitizenTube [3] .
The increasing popularity of citizen journalism is starting however to raise important questions concerning the credibility of impactful videos (see e.g., [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] ). The potential impact of such videos, coupled with the use of financial incentives, can motivate workers to fabricate data. The media abounds with examples of fraudulent videos and images [8] , [9] , [10] , [11] , often captured at different locations than claimed (see e.g., Fig. 1 ).
Videos from other sources can be copied, projected and recaptured, cut and stitched before being uploaded as genuine on social media sites. For instance, plagiarized videos with fabricated location and time stamps can be created through "projection" attacks: the attacker uses specialized apps [12] , [13] , [14] to set the GPS position of the device to a desired location, then uses the device to shoot a projected version of the target video.
Citizen Evidence Lab [4] and Witness.Org [15] provide tutorials to train the public to create and to assess citizen reports, including those captured with mobile devices. InformaCam [16] provides mechanisms to ensure that the media was captured by a specific device at a certain location and time. InformaCam is however ineffective against adversaries that capture projected videos: while the resulting videos are fraudulent, they have been shot with the claimed device, at the claimed location and time. While manual verifications can detect projection attacks, they do not scale well to the high number of videos on social media sites.
To address this problem, we exploit the observation that for plagiarized videos, the motion encoded in the video stream is likely inconsistent with the motion from the inertial sensor streams (e.g., accelerometer) of the device. Movee [17] , a video liveness verification solution that uses this principle, has important weaknesses: i) it is not user transparent to the extent that it imposes an explicit verification step on users, ii) it severely limits the movements in the verification step to one of four pan movements, and iii) it is vulnerable to "stitch" attacks in which the attacker creates a fraudulent video by first live recording a genuine video and then pointing the camera to a pre-recorded target video.
In this paper, we introduce Vamos, a Video Accreditation through Motion Signatures system. Vamos provides liveness verifications for videos of arbitrary length. Vamos is completely transparent to the users; it requires no special user interaction, nor change in user behavior.
Instead of enforcing an initial verification step, Vamos uses the entire video and acceleration stream for verification purposes: It divides the video and acceleration data into fixed length chunks. It then classifies each chunk and uses the results, along with a suite of novel features that we introduce, to classify the entire sample. Vamos does not impose a dominant motion direction, thus, does not constrain the user movements. Instead, Vamos verifies the liveness of the video by extracting features from all the directions of movement, from both the video and acceleration streams.
Removed video length and movement constraints provide additional flexibility for attackers to create fraudulent videos. In order to study the security of the new unconstrained setting, we i) propose a novel, motion based video classification system, ii) introduce a suite of human centric and fully automated attacks that target sensor based video liveness verification systems, and iii) show experimental evidence on a wide range of data collected through user studies and from public sources.
The attacks we introduce seek to produce accelerometer readings that enable the attackers to thwart Vamos and claim the production of plagiarized videos, on their mobile devices. While some of the attacks leverage accelerometer data produced on the attacker device, several attacks enable the attacker to fabricate accelerometer readings of their choice.
Since Vamos leverages accelerometer data simultaneously captured on the same device with the video, it can only validate videos recorded using the Vamos "client" app, see Section 3.
To evaluate Vamos, we have collected 150 citizen journalism videos from YouTube and performed a user study to collect 160 free-form videos and corresponding acceleration samples. Our experiments show that Vamos improves on the free-form video motion verification accuracy of Movee by more than 15 percent in the domain of 6 second cluster and isandwich attack videos, and by more than 30 percent in the domain of whole length stitch attack videos (see Section 3 for the attack description). We show that Vamos performs unexpectedly well on a suite of mirror attack variants, that fabricate acceleration readings based on video motion streams.
We posit that the success rate of the attacks depends on the type of motions encoded in the video. Experiments with 6s chunks extracted from the free-form videos confirm (through x 2 and Fisher's exact tests) that the classification performance of Vamos depends on the video category. We show that the proposed motion based video classification can be used to predict the accuracy of Vamos on videos for which we currently lack associated sensor streams (e.g., YouTube videos). To summarize, this paper makes the following contributions: 
THE PROBLEM, MOTIVATION, AND RELATED WORK
The problem of verifying the authenticity of videos uploaded to a social media site (e.g., from conflicts in Syria, Ukraine or Venezuela) is paramount to the ability to use such videos as evidence or trusted sources for journalism. Citizen Evidence Lab observes that it is common occurrence during complex emergencies and natural disasters for old pictures and videos to be recycled as new online, and go viral due to uncritical re-sharing through social networks [4] . This problem has several dimensions, that include assessing the location and time of capture, or the content of the video. For instance, CitizenEvidenceLab provides tutorials to train the public to asses citizen videos from YouTube. It also provides tools (e.g., YouTube DataViewer) to enable users to extract the exact local upload time, all thumbnails and audio only from YouTube videos.
Witness.Org [15] is an organization that trains and supports people using video in their fight for human rights. It provides a set of rules that enable concerned citizens to safely capture quality videos that witness important events.
InformaCam [16] leverages the unique noise of the device camera to sign content it produces, along with the output of other sensors (e.g., GPS). This enables InformaCam to authenticate that content has been produced with a certain camera. InformaCam assumes that the sensor data is valid and has not been fabricated, and is vulnerable to plagiarism attacks where the attacker points the camera to a projected video. In this paper we focus on liveness verifications: verify that the video was captured on a mobile device, and has not been fabricated using material from other sources.
Movee [17] is a liveness verification solution that imposes a 6 second verification step on video capturing experiences: before being allowed to shoot the desired video, the user is presented with a target (bullseye) symbol displayed randomly either on the top, bottom, left or the right side of the screen. The user needs to align the center of the screen to the bullseye, by moving the device in its direction.
Movee uses the correspondence between the motion sensors and video motion to provide a preliminary liveness verification solution. Movee is however severely limited, as (i) the "verification" step is constrained to the initial few seconds of the video, and (ii) the system dictates the user to pan the camera in a specific direction rather than gracefully accept the natural motion of the user. These limitations significantly impact the practical application of Movee.
Furthermore, Movee is vulnerable to the potent attacks that we study in this paper. For example, an attacker starts Movee and points to a portion of a target video playing on a projection screen, performs a pan motion as specified by Movee, then points the camera to the whole frame of the fraudulent video. Since Movee only uses the initial 6s chunk, the resulting sample passes Movee's verifications. Furthermore, in Section 7.3 we quantitatively show the ineffectiveness of Movee for free-form movements even in 6s chunks: on the attacks we introduce, Movee's false positive rate is as low as 38 percent and its false negative rate is 28 percent.
We introduce Vamos to address these limitations and provide the first video liveness verification system that works on unconstrained, free-form videos, does not impose a "verification" step on users, and is resilient to a suite of powerful, sensor based attacks.
This article extends our earlier work [18] with the mirror attack and two complex variants, the (i, p, c)-mirror and perturbed fingerprint attacks. We show that Vamos performs surprisingly well on these attacks, and provide insights into this result. We have also performed several new experiments: (i) test Vamos on videos that belong to categories on which it was not trained, (ii) test Vamos on instances fabricated according to attacks on which it was not trained, and (iii) train Vamos on instances belonging to all the video category and attack types, before testing it.
Vamos can leverage the infrastructure of existing systems that capture sensor data simultaneously with video streams, e.g., the Focus system of Jain et al. [19] . Focus is a video analytics solution that pairs the video content with data from GPS, compass, accelerometer, and gyroscope sensors. It performs real time analysis and clustering of user-uploaded video streams, to identify videos of the same event, uploaded by multiple users.
Several video watermarking algorithms have been proposed for video content authentication [20] , [21] . The goal of Vamos is however not to authenticate the recorded video, but to verify the video liveness claim. We note that watermarking only works if all the videos in the world employ it. Furthermore, the defenses provided by invisible watermarks are defeated by projection attacks.
Liu et al. [22] proposed a solution for summarizing (i.e., extracting important frames from) mobile videos captured simultaneously with acceleration and orientation streams.
The acceleration values are used to exclude outliers. Abdollahian et al. [23] define a "camera view" concept, and use camera motion parameters to temporally segment, summarize and annotate user generated videos. It will be interesting to evaluate a more efficient, video summary based Vamos that identifies discrepancies between video and acceleration summaries.
SYSTEM AND ADVERSARY MODEL
We consider a system that consists of a service provider (e.g., YouTube [24] , iReport [1] , Stringwire [2] ) and multiple subscribers. The service provider offers an interface for subscribers to upload videos captured on their mobile devices. We assume subscribers own devices equipped with a camera and inertial sensors (i.e., acceleration). Devices have Internet connectivity, which, for the purpose of this work may be intermittent. Each user is required to install an application on her mobile device, which we henceforth denote as the "client".
The client simultaneously captures video and acceleration streams from the device. It then uploads them to her account hosted by the service provider. The provider uses Vamos to verify the data uploaded. Specifically, Vamos divides the video and acceleration data into fixed length chunks. For each chunk, it extracts motion vectors from the video and the accelerometer streams, then generates features that encode the similarity of the two motion vectors. Vamos uses these features to classify each chunk as either genuine or fraudulent. Vamos uses the results of the chunk level classifications to extract a second set of features that model the similarity of the original, whole video and acceleration data. It then uses supervised learning to classify the uploaded video as genuine or fraudulent. If genuine, the provider makes the video publicly accessible, but keeps the acceleration stream secret, or even discards it.
We assume that while the service provider is honest, users can be malicious. Users can fraudulently claim ownership (creation) of videos they upload. We assume that attackers do not have access to the acceleration stream of videos they intend to plagiarize. Thus, they are required to fabricate acceleration streams for the uploaded videos.
We introduce several manual and automatic attacks that produce acceleration streams that "match" targeted videos. Vamos, or other sensor based video liveness verification systems are not yet available in video hosting sites. Thus, the attacks that we propose and implement here are hypothetical. However, our goal is to anticipate the adversarial strategy changes likely to occur once video liveness verification systems are adopted. This enables us to evaluate the resilience of Vamos to such strategy changes, and be two steps ahead of adversaries.
Let A denote the algorithm used by the attacker. Let V denote the "target" video that the attacker wants to plagiarize. Let G A denote additional information used by the attacker. For instance, G A may include other videos and corresponding acceleration streams. We denote the output of A as AðV; G A Þ = Acc, the acceleration stream produced for V .
We introduce first the "sandwich" attack, that enables the attacker to manually produce the acceleration data. This attack conjectures that it should be easy for a human adversary to emulate the movement observed in a target video and thus "manually" produce a matching accelerometer stream.
Sandwich Attack. The attacker studies the video V and emulates the observed movement. For instance, A stacks two devices. The attacker plays the target video V on the top device. He then moves the device stack to emulate the movement seen on the top device. The device on the bottom records the resulting acceleration data, Acc. A outputs Acc.
We now describe the cluster attack: pair the target video with the acceleration stream copied from a "similar" but genuine sample. This attack explores the hypothesis that an attacker with a large dataset of genuine video and accelerometer streams, will be able to identify a pair whose motion resembles the motion of the target video.
Cluster Attack. A captures a dataset of genuine (video, acceleration) samples and stores them in G A . A uses a clustering algorithm (e.g., K-means [25] ) to cluster the videos based on their movement. A classifies the target V according to its movement and assigns it to one of the previously generated clusters: the cluster containing videos whose movement is closest to V . A randomly picks one of the genuine (video, acceleration) samples in the cluster. Let ðV 0 ; Acc 0 Þ be the chosen sample. A outputs Acc 0 . We now introduce fully automatic "mirror" attacks, that copy the video motion stream into the accelerometer stream. The hypothesis explored by this attack is that since identical video and accelerometer streams will "match" perfectly, they will be accepted as genuine.
Perfect Mirror Attack. Given a target video V , the adversary A extracts its video motion stream (e.g., using the VMA module of Section 5.2) and uses it to set the attack acceleration stream, Acc. The output of the attack consists of (V , Acc). Thus, this attack "mirrors" the video motion stream into the acceleration stream.
In Section 7.3 we show that the above hypothesis does not hold: Vamos achieves perfect accuracy against the perfect mirror attack. This is because a classifier easily learns that perfect matches are fraudulent. In the following, we introduce two variations on this attack. The intuition behind these two attacks is that perturbations in the accelerometer data produce imperfect, but still "close" matches, resulting in genuine looking video and accelerometer data.
(i, p, c)-Mirror Attack. After copying the motion stream extracted from the target video V , into the fabricated acceleration stream Acc, the adversary A performs a ðp; i; cÞ alteration of the stream. Specifically, A inserts i points in the accelerometer stream, randomly perturbs each accelerometer reading between Àp and p percent, then applies a calibration factor c. We detail the process and the choice of the parameters, in Section 6.3.
The PFA attack fabricates an accelerometer stream as a patch of tiny snippets that emulate real life data in the number of "errors" when matching against the plagiarized video stream. We conjecture that such an accelerometer stream produces a more realistic match. Specifically, PFA perturbs the copied video motion stream for each snippet, to produce a video and acceleration snippet that will have an amount of "inconsistency" that emulates the inconsistency between a similar, but genuine video and acceleration snippet.
Perturbed Fingerprint Attack (PFA). Given a target video V , PFA initializes the fraudulent acceleration stream Acc to the motion stream of V . PFA generalizes the (i, p, c)-mirror attack. Unlike the (i, p, c)-mirror attack, that uses a single set of perturbation factors, PFA splits V and Acc into 0.5s "snippets", and dynamically determines the amount of perturbation to be applied to each snippet. For this, PFA leverages a "dictionary" that it constructs from set of genuine video and acceleration samples. We provide implementation details in Section 6.3.
Next we introduce the stitch attack, that concatenates a plagiarized (video, acceleration) chunk with several genuine chunks. The intuition behind this attack is that video and accelerometer streams that differ only on a few sections, will have a high similarity, due to the genuine chunks. This similarity will make it harder for a sensor based video liveness verification solution to differentiate fraudulent and genuine data. In Section 6.3 we construct stitched samples from multiple fraudulent and genuine chunks.
Stitch Attack. A takes as input parameters the target video V and two integers, g > 0 and 0 k g. A first creates a set of genuine video and acceleration chunks, G A ¼ fðV 1 ; Acc 1 Þ; . . . ; ðV 1 ; Acc g Þg, e.g., by capturing them on the mobile device. A uses one of the above attacks to fabricate Acc, an acceleration stream for V . A then "stitches" the fake chunk ðV; AccÞ with the genuine chunks G A , according to the index k. Let jj denote the concatenation operation, applicable both to video and acceleration streams. Then, A outputs ðV a ; Acc a Þ, where V a ¼ V 1 jj::V kÀ1 jjV jjV kþ1 ::jjV g and Acc a ¼ Acc 1 jj . . . Acc kÀ1 jj Acc jj Acc kþ1 . . . jj Acc g .
Difficulty of Implementing the Attacks. Each of the above attacks require the attacker to write code, either to collect sensor data, to implement a video motion based clustering algorithm, to copy and perturb video motion data, or to stitch accelerometer streams from multiple sources. We note that while an adversary can easily follow the attack description to implement the code, this only needs to be done by one person, who can then share or even sell it to regular, but adversarial users, who want to thwart sensor based video liveness verification defenses.
The cluster attack requires the adversary to manually collect a dataset of video and accelerometer streams. While the dataset collection is a difficult task, it is a one time effort. The sandwich attack, similarly requires manual effort. However, different from the cluster attack, that effort needs to be invested for each video targeted for plagiarism.
We conclude that strictly automatic attacks (i.e., the mirror attack and variants) are the easiest to perform. The manual attack (sandwich) and hybrid manual and automatic attack (cluster) are harder to perform as they also require human intervention. However, we note that the cluster attack can be fully automated if attackers pool their resources to collect and share the dataset of video and accelerometer streams. In addition, in our experiments, see Section 6.3, we observed that the two participants asked to perform the sandwich attack on real videos, took only seconds to study the target video and capture accelerometer data.
A CLASSIFICATION OF MOBILE VIDEOS
We posit that the success rate of the attacks previously introduced depends on the type of motions encoded in the video. For instance, it seems intuitive that videos where the hand-held device is stationary are easier to plagiarize. To verify our conjecture, we propose a general classification of videos captured on mobile devices, based on the following dimensions:
User motion: We consider two types of recorder motions, "standing" and "walking", but no motions such as jumping or driving. Camera motion: We consider three types of camera motions: "stationary", "scanning" and "following". "Scanning" means the camera moves in a direction (e.g., left to right) at a pace independent of the subject of the video. "Following" means the camera moves to maintain the subject within the confines of the video. We have not considered videos shot with head mounted cameras. Distance to subject: We consider video subjects that are either "close" or "far" to the camera. If the camera focuses on the subject of the video and only a limited area of the background is observed in the video, we say the subject is "close". Otherwise, the subject is "far". Table 1 shows the resulting 12 mobile video categories. Fig. 6 shows the category distribution of YouTube and freeform video sets we collected (Sections 6.1 and 7.1).
A more fine grained classification of video categories is possible. For instance, Wang et al. [26] proposed a video and sensor based technique for visual identification of humans, that extracts "motion fingerprints", i.e., strings of "micro-activities" such as stop, turn, step frequency, and walking direction.
VAMOS: VIDEO ACCREDITATION THROUGH MOTION SIGNATURES
In this section we introduce Vamos (Video Accreditation Through Motion Signatures) an un-constrained video liveness analysis system. The verifications of Vamos leverage the entire video and acceleration sample. This is in contrast with Movee, that relies only on the initial section of the sample. Vamos consists of the three step process illustrated in Fig. 2 . First, it divides the input sample into equal length chunks. Second, it classifies each chunk as either genuine or fraudulent. Third, it combines the results of the second step with a suite of novel features to produce a final decision for the original sample. In the following, we detail each of these steps.
Chunk Extraction
The "chunking" process divides a video and acceleration sample S ¼ ðV; AccÞ into fixed length chunks. We consider a 1s granularity of division. While 6s is the chunk length we use in the experiments, we consider here a parameter l to denote the length in seconds of the chunks. We call a transition point to be the time when the sample transitions from one video motion category to another (e.g., from category 4 to category 8). Let a transition chunk, denote a l second chunk that contains parts that belong to multiple video categories. Let V ½s; t and Acc½s; t denote a segment of V and Acc that starts at second s and ends at second t. The chunking process produces a set C of chunks, initially empty. Let L denote the length of the ðV; AccÞ sample. We propose three chunking techniques, illustrated in Fig. 3 . Sequential chunking is the obvious way of dividing arbitrary length streams into chunks. Segment based chunking attempts to make the division such that each chunk has a consistent video motion class. The output of sequential and segment based chunking is easy to predict by an adversary. Randomized chunking addresses this problem, by performing the division at random positions.
Sequential chunking. Divide ðV; AccÞ into sequential chunks, starting with the beginning. Let n ¼ jCj ¼ dL=le. Then, C ¼ fðV ½ 0; l À 1; Acc½ 0; l À 1Þ, ðV ½ l; 2l À 1; Acc½l; 2l À 1Þ:: ðV ½l ðc À 1Þ; À1; Acc½lðc À 1Þ; lc À 1Þg.
Segment based chunking. Identify the transition points of the sample ðV; AccÞ. Let a sample segment denote the part of a sample between either (i) the beginning of the sample and the first transition point, (ii) two transition points, or (iii) the last transition point and the end of the sample. Discard all segments of ðV; AccÞ whose length is less than l. Divide remaining segments according to the sequential chunking described above.
Randomized chunking. Produces k chunks, 0 < k L, where k is an input argument, as follows. Generate k different index values within the sample, 0 i 1 ; ::; i k L such that for any s and t, 1 s; t k, i s þ l 6 ¼ i t . For each i j ,
Sequential chunking may produce transition chunks, that contain one or more transition points. Segment based chunking will not produce transition chunks. However, segment based chunking requires a mechanism to identify transition points. Randomized chunking can produce transition chunks and also overlapping chunks. Sequential and segment based chunking produce strictly non-overlapping chunks. 
CL-Vamos: Chunk Level Verification
In the second step, Vamos classifies each chunk produced by the first step, as either genuine or fraudulent. While Movee [17] works on fixed length chunks, it is limited to video and inertial sensor streams that encode one of 4 movements (up, down, to the left, or to the right). Specifically, 3 of the 14 features of Movee are (i) the placement of the bullseye relative to the center of the screen, (ii) the dominant video motion direction and (iii) the dominant sensor motion direction. We introduce here CL-Vamos, the first liveness verification solution that works on free form chunks, that encode unrestricted movements. Similar to Movee, CL-Vamos analyzes the consistency of the inferred motion from the simultaneously and independently captured video and acceleration streams. First, it uses an efficient image processing method to infer a motion vector over the timeline of the video from frame-by-frame progress. Second, it converts the raw inertial sensor readings into a motion vector over the same timeline. Third, CL-Vamos uses the Dynamic Time Warping algorithm (DTW) [27] to find the set of operations that minimizes the cost of converting one vector to the other. We now detail each of these steps. The first two steps are borrowed from Movee [17] and are thus only briefly described.
Video Motion Analysis (VMA). Given as input the captured video stream, the VMA module outputs an estimate for the direction and magnitude of the camera movement. Given pairs of consecutive frames, VMA uses "phase correlation" to find the movement of the camera and output a frame-byframe displacement vector. Specifically, phase correlation finds the shift between two consecutive frames that minimizes the difference between the two frames. It leverages the Fourier shift property: a shift in the spatial domain of two images results in a linear phase difference in the frequency domain of the Fourier Transform (FT) [28] . It then performs an element-wise multiplication of the transformed images, computes the inverse Fourier transform (IFT) of the result, and finds the shift that corresponds to the maximum amplitude-producing the resultant displacement.
VMA applies the phase correlation method to obtain linear shifts between frames in both the x and y axes. It then computes the cumulative shift along the x and y axes by adding up the linear shifts for all consecutive frames retrieved from that video. The cumulative shifts on the x and y axes, along with the orientation of the camera, enable VMA to infer the camera direction of movement. We use the cumulative shifts and camera motion direction as feature descriptors.
Inertial Sensor Motion Analysis (IMA). The Inertial Sensor Motion Analysis (IMA) module leverages the accelerometer sensor in order to produce a motion direction and magnitude; this data will be used to verify its consistency with the output of the VMA module. Given the raw accelerometer data, captured at a 16 Hz frequency, the IMA module uses a combination of low-pass and high-pass filters in order to remove the effects of gravity. IMA then uses the filtered accelerometer data to extract the motion direction and distance of the device, producing 3 cumulative shift vectors, one along each of the x, y and z axes.
Similarity Computation (SC). The Similarity Computation (SC) module compares the two motion sequences computed by the VMA and the IMA modules. It returns a set of features that summarize the nature of the similarity between the two sequences. In Movee, the SC module computes the similarity of the two motion sequences on only one axis, i.e., the dominant direction of movement.
CL-
Instead, we have investigated a wide range of features on both the x and y axes. Due to lack of space we report and evaluate here (see Section 7) the feature combination that achieved the best performance. Specifically, CL-Vamos computes the DTW between the motion vectors extracted from the projections of the video and acceleration streams on both the x and y axes. For each axis, DTW returns the number of diagonal, expansion and contraction moves that convert one vector to the other, and the cost of the resulting transformation. CL-Vamos uses this information to generate the following features, for both the x and y axes:
The DTW distance (transformation cost) between the video frame shift and acceleration streams. The ratio of overlap points: the number of overlapping points in the two motion vectors divided by the length of the vectors. The ratio of diagonal, expansion and contraction moves to the number of points in the vectors. Classification. Manually identifying threshold values for the above metrics, that would differentiate between fraudulent and genuine samples, is a difficult task, made even more complex by the adversarial setup of the problem: the adversary could exploit knowledge of explicit threshold values. Instead, we leverage supervised learning algorithms to perform this task automatically, learning threshold values from multiple genuine and fraudulent data samples.
Specifically, CL-Vamos uses the above features, along with other Movee features (e.g., the cumulative shift of the video and accelerometer on the x and y axes), with supervised learning to train classifiers. For each chunk C i in C, let c i 2 fgenuine; fakeg denote the classification produced by CL-Vamos, and let a i 2 fgenuine; fakeg denote the actual status of the chunk. We consider a "positive" to denote a fake chunk, and a "negative" to denote a genuine chunk.
We observe that the false positive rate of CL-Vamos, FPR = Prðc i ¼ fakeja i ¼ genuineÞ. That is, the false positive rate denotes the probability that a chunk is classified as fake (positive), given that the chunk is in fact genuine. Similarly, the false negative rate is FNR = Prðc i ¼ genuineja i ¼ fakeÞ, the true positive rate is TPR = Prðc i ¼ fakeja i ¼ fakeÞ and the true positive rate is TNR = Prðc i ¼ genuineja i ¼ genuineÞ.
Vamos: Whole Video Classification
Let us assume that for a sample S ¼ ðV; AccÞ, f chunks in C have been classified as fraudulent and g chunks have been classified as genuine. Let n ¼ f þ g ¼ jCj. We say S is genuine iff 8i ¼ 1::n, a i = "gen". S is fake if 9i, i ¼ 1::n, s.t., a i = "fake". We can write the probability that the sample S ¼ ðV; AccÞ is fake, PrðS ¼ fakeÞ, given the above classification result, as 
:n. The probability that the sample S is fake, PrðS ¼ fakeÞ. 
DATA COLLECTION
We have collected datasets of citizen journalism videos from YouTube and of free-form (video, accelerometer) samples from real users. We have also created datasets of fraudulent samples following the attacks introduced in Section 3. In the following we detail each dataset.
YouTube Video Collection
We have collected 150 random citizen journalism videos from YouTube, in the following manner. First, we have identified relevant topics using Wikipedia's "Current Events" site [29] , BBC [30] and CNN [31] . They include political events (e.g., Ukraine, Venezuela, Middle East), natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes, tsunamis, meteorite landing), extreme sports and wild life encounters. We have used keywords from such events to identify videos in YouTube that have been captured by a regular person, using a mobile camera. We have discarded videos shot by a professional cameraman or using a head mounted camera. We collected the 150 videos from 139 users accounts. We have made public this list of videos [32] . The total length of the 150 videos is 13,107 seconds. We analyze this dataset in Section 7.1.
Free-Form Video Collection
In previous work, Saini et al. [33] collected a dataset of 473 video clips (along with accelerometer and compass readings) simultaneously recorded by users attending the same performance events. Cricri et al. [34] , [35] exploit auxiliary sensor data to infer information about the video content. They show that multiple user records of a common scene can be used to detect generic and specific events.
Instead, we performed a user study to simultaneously collect mobile videos shot by users without any motion restrictions, and the associated accelerometer readings. We first briefly describe the implementation of Vamos, then detail the free-form video collection process.
Vamos Implementation. We have implemented the Vamos client using Android, and a server component using C++, R and PHP. We used the OpenCV (Open Source Computer Vision) library [36] for the video motion analysis. We used Nexus 4 smartphones (Android OS Jelly Bean version 4.2 with 1.5 GHz CPU) to experiment with Vamos. Nexus 4 captures video at 30 fps (frames per second) and samples accelerometer readings at a rate of 16.67Hz [37] . The code is available on the project website [38] .
Ethical Considerations. We have used the Vamos application to collect video and acceleration samples from real life users. We have worked with the Institutional Review Board (protocol number IRB-13-0582) at FIU to ensure an ethical interaction with the users and collection of the data.
Free-Form Data Set. We have collected data from 16 users. 1 Each user was asked to use Vamos, following the instructions shown on the screen: move the device in any direction to capture videos. Each user contributed 10 free-form videos and accelerometer data, producing a free-form dataset of 160 videos. We have manually annotated the free-form dataset video samples according to the categories described in Table 1 .
We have divided each sample of the free-form dataset into 6s chunks, using segment based chunking (see Section 5), producing a total of 401 genuine chunks. Table 2 shows the distribution of the chunks into categories. We have made the free-form dataset publicly available [38] .
Attack Datasets
We have used the free-form dataset (see Section 6.2) to create the following attack datasets.
Sandwich Attack Dataset. Two skilled users have performed the sandwich attack on the 160 free-form video dataset. We have used the following procedure, for each whole video (not at chunk level). The attacker watches the target video an unlimited number of times. The attacker stacks two phones. The attacker plays the target video on the top device. The bottom device records the acceleration readings during the session. The attacker can shoot any number of takes, until satisfied with the result.
We combine the original video with the resulting attack acceleration sample to produce a "sandwich sample". We used the segment based chunking method to divide each sandwich sample into 6s (video, acceleration). Thus, each sandwich chunk corresponds to one of the free-form chunks. The sandwich chunk dataset contains thus 401 genuine and 401 fraudulent chunks.
Cluster Attack Dataset. We ran K-means clustering [25] on the free-form chunk dataset, to cluster the chunks according to their motion (see Cluster attack). We applied the v-fold cross-validation algorithm [39] to determine the optimal number of clusters in our dataset. The outcome was K = 6. The cluster attack dataset consists of two subsets, of genuine and fraudulent (video, acceleration) chunks. We used the free-form chunk dataset as the genuine data. To create the fraudulent subset, for each genuine chunk, we randomly chose another chunk from the same (motion) cluster. We then coupled the video from the first chunk with the inertial sensor data of the randomly selected chunk. Thus, the genuine and fraudulent subsets of the cluster attack dataset each contain 401 chunks.
Perfect Mirror Attack Dataset. For each of the 401 genuine chunks, we have created a perfect mirror fraudulent chunk: We copied the video from the genuine chunk, and set its accelerometer stream to be the motion stream we extract from the video. Thus, the perfect mirror attack dataset consists of 401 genuine and 401 fraudulent chunks.
(i, p, c)-Mirror Attack Dataset.For each genuine chunk, we have created a fraudulent chunk. Similar to the (i, p, c)-mirror attack, we have initialized the acceleration stream of the fraudulent chunk with the video motion stream. Then, we performed a 3 step alteration of the acceleration stream as follows. First, stretch the acceleration stream: between each pair of consecutive acceleration readings, we insert i 2 R f2; 3g new points. The value of each inserted reading is set to be equal to the mean of the previous and next readings in the stream. The reason for the stretching step is that in Vamos, the ratio of the number of acceleration readings to the video motion readings is around 2.5.
Second, "perturb" each resulting accelerometer reading a, to a value chosen randomly in the interval ½að1 À pÞ; að1 þ pÞ. We have chosen p ¼ 0:1 for our experiments, as it is sufficient to prevent suspicious, perfect matches between the video and acceleration streams, and also to prevent the creation of random acceleration streams. Third, multiply each resulting acceleration value by an empirically chosen factor c 2 R ½1; 2. This step "calibrates" the acceleration stream to the observed range of 1 to 2 higher than the video motion readings, of genuine samples.
Perturbed Fingerprint Attack (PFA) Attack Dataset. PFA uses 10 percent (40) of the chunks in the 401 genuine chunk dataset, to build the dictionary The dictionary consists of 10 buckets, each corresponding to one of the intervals ½0; 10Þ; ½10; 20Þ; ::; ½90 À 100. For each of the 40 chunks, PFA does the following. First, split the chunk (video and acceleration) into 0.5s long snippets. Compute the DTW of the snippet and generate the DTW's percentage of match moves out of all the moves. Identify the bucket whose range contains this value, and add the snippet to it. The dictionary contains 480 ¼ 40Â 6 Â 0:5 genuine snippets.
PFA randomly picks half of the remaining 361 (401-41) chunks to be genuine, and half to generate fraudulent chunks. It uses the dictionary to extend the (i, p, c)-mirror attack and create the fraudulent chunks. For each fraudulent chunk, PFA performs the following steps. First, replace the acceleration stream with the motion stream extracted from the video. Split the resulting sample into 0.5s long snippets. For each snippet (identified as snp in the following), use the video part to identify the nearest neighbor (in terms of motion) snippet from the dictionary. Use the bucket of the nearest neighbor to determine the amount of perturbation to be applied to the acceleration of snp. Specifically, pick a random value x within the interval of the bucket of the nearest neighbor. x percent of the accelerometer readings of snp will remain unchanged, to contribute to x percent match moves. Randomly pick 1 À x percent of the accelerometer readings of snp, and apply an (i, p, c)-mirror transformation to them. The i and c values are set as in the (i, p, c)-mirror transformation. The perturbation factor p is a parameter to this dataset, see Section 7.3.
Stitch Attack Datasets. We have built two stitch attack datasets, one based on the fake cluster chunks and one on the fake sandwich chunks of the previous two attack datasets. The construction process is the following. First, we discarded 4 out of the 160 free-form samples, as they do not have a 6s chunk belonging to a single category. We then discarded 43 samples that have only one chunk. For each of the 113 remaining samples (that has at least 2 chunks), we construct 3 fraudulent samples. For instance, for a 2 chunk genuine sample, we create a fraudulent sample having the first chunk fake, the second genuine, one where the first chunk is genuine, but the second is fake, and one where both chunks are fake. For samples with more than 3 chunks, the position of the fake chunks in any of the 3 created fake samples is randomly selected. The fake chunks are from either the sandwich or the cluster chunk datasets. Fig. 4 illustrates the generation of fraudulent samples given a genuine free-form sample of 3 chunks. The reason for dropping samples with less than 2 chunks is that we need to create the same number of fake samples given any genuine sample (3 fakes per genuine sample). Samples with 1 chunk cannot produce 3 fake stitch samples, thus had to be discarded. The resulting stitch datasets based on the cluster and sandwich attacks have thus each 339 fake samples (ð160 À 4 À 43Þ Â 3).
EVALUATION
We first report our experience in classifying the collected video datasets. We then evaluate the ability of CL-Vamos to classify 6s chunks from the free-form dataset, as either genuine or fraudulent. Finally, we evaluate the performance of Vamos on the whole length samples from the free-form dataset.
Metrics. In the following, the TPR (True Positive Rate) metric denotes the fraction of videos correctly identified as fraudulent, the FPR (False Positive Rate) denotes the fraction of videos incorrectly identified as fraudulent and the FNR (False Negative Rate) denotes the fraction of videos incorrectly identified as genuine. Accuracy denotes the ratio of the number of video correctly classified (either as Fig. 4 . Stitch attack example. For a genuine sample of three chunks, the attacker produces three fake samples, with one to three fake (red) chunks. The genuine chunks are copied from the genuine sample. fraudulent or genuine) to the total number of videos classified (including those correctly and incorrectly classified).
Video Dataset Classification
Two users (paper authors) have manually annotated the YouTube and free-form datasets based on the criteria described in Section 4. Since a single video can include sections belonging to different motion categories, the result of the annotation process consists of tuples of the form (start time, end time, category id), where the first two fields denote the start and end time of a video section (measured in seconds) and the last field denotes the id of the video category (integer ranging from 1 to 12). At the end of the process, we have computed a tally of the number of seconds of video belonging to each of the 12 video motion categories. Fig. 5 shows the percentage of each video motion category in the collected videos, as produced by the two annotators. We observe a similar outcome for the two annotators. Motion categories 2 and 1 have the largest, whereas categories 12, 8, 9 and 10 have the smallest representation.
The manual process enabled us to detect a discrepancy between the annotations of two users, for categories 3 and 7. Specifically, a walking user recording a nearby scene without moving the camera, produces a video that can be (visually) categorized as either 3 or 7. We have labeled these video with a separate category denoted by "3&7". Similarly, when a standing user is following a moving subject, but the subject is moving toward (or away from) the camera, the camera movement of the resulting video can be interpreted as either following or stationary. Fig. 6a shows the overall category distribution of the YouTube dataset, as an average of the distributions of the two annotators. The motion categories 2 and 1 have the largest representation, whereas category 12 has the smallest representation. Fig. 6b shows the category distribution of the free-form dataset, and Table 2 shows the category distribution of the free-form chunks. The difference in distributions of the YouTube and free-form datasets is likely due to the fact that the free-form video collection scenarios have different dynamics from citizen journalism scenarios.
Experiment Setup for CL-Vamos
CL-Vamos uses supervised learning algorithms to determine if a video is genuine. We have experimented with several classifiers, including MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP) [40] , Decision Trees (DT) (C4.5), Random Forest (RF) [41] and Bagging [42] . We have used the Weka data mining suite [43] to perform the experiments, with default settings. For the backpropagation algorithm of the MLP classifier, we set the learning rate to 0.3 and the momentum rate to 0.2.
To compare CL-Vamos and Movee [17] on the 11 video categories, we have designed three experiments, that evaluate different scenarios. In a "category centric" test, for each category c, we use 80 percent randomly selected data from c for training and the rest of 20 percent for testing. This test evaluates the solution when only knowledge of the video's category exists. In a "mixed data" experiment, for each category c, we split the data into 10 equal sized folds. Then, in each of 10 iterations, we train the classifier on 9 folds from all the categories, and test on the data of the remaining fold from c. Repeat the procedure 10 times, ensuring each fold of c appears once in the test dataset. This test evaluates performance when knowledge of all the categories exists. In the third, "novelty" test, for each category c, we train the supervised learning algorithm on all the data from all the categories with the exception of c. We then test the algorithm on all the data from c. This experiment aims to predict performance on samples whose video motion category has not been seen before.
CL-Vamos: Attack Detection
Detection of the Cluster Attack. We first compare the per category performance of CL-Vamos and Movee on the cluster attack dataset (see Section 6.3). For CL-Vamos, we have used the Random Forest algorithm, as it performed the best in our experiments. Table 3 shows our results for the "category" experiment, including the true positive rate (TPR), false positive rate (FPR), false negative rate (FNR) and accuracy (Acc). We observe a low accuracy, ranging between 54 percent (category 8) and 72 percent (category 9). Table 4 shows the TPR, FPR, FNR and accuracy results for CL-Vamos on the "mixed data" experiment. The per category accuracy ranges between 75 and 85 percent, a The accuracy is low, ranging between 54 and 72 percent.
significant increase over the "category" experiment. This shows that additional data, even from other categories, can benefit the performance of CL-Vamos. This is confirmed by the "novelty" experiment, see Table 5 : While its lowest accuracy is 71 percent, its highest accuracy is 88 percent. Thus, even with knowledge only from other categories, CL-Vamos can accurately classify chunks from a newly seen category. Fig. 7 summarizes the per-category accuracy achieved by CL-Vamos in the category centric, mixed data and novelty experiments. In the mixed data and novelty experiments, CL-Vamos consistently achieves better performance than on the category centric experiment.
Detection of the Sandwich Attack. We now evaluate CL-Vamos on the sandwich attack dataset of Section 6.3. Table 6 shows the its performance on the category centric experiment. Its accuracy ranges between 64 and 87 percent, showing a marked improvement over the corresponding experiment on the cluster attack dataset. Table 7 shows the per-category TPR, FPR, FNR and accuracy results of CL-Vamos on the mixed data experiment. The results show an improvement over both the category centric experiment, and over the mixed data experiment on the cluster attack dataset. Table 8 shows the results of CL-Vamos on the novelty experiment: its accuracy can be as high as 95 percent. Fig. 8 summarizes the per-category accuracy achieved by CL-Vamos in the category centric, mixed data and novelty experiments.
Conclusion #1. The results of the novelty experiment for the cluster and sandwich attack show that CL-Vamos can be expected to perform quite well even if presented with videos that belong to categories that might not have been considered in our video motion classification.
Category Dependency. We now verify the intuition that the variation in FNR, FPR and accuracy of CL-Vamos is due to its dependence on the video motion categories. We have performed both Pearson's x 2 and Fisher's exact test on the results of CL-Vamos for the sandwich attack dataset. The null The accuracy is as high as 85 percent (on category 11.) we observe that knowledge of other categories significantly improves the accuracy of CL-Vamos. Knowledge of data from all other categories enables CL-Vamos to accurately classify a novel category. The accuracy ranges between 64 and 87 percent, a marked improvement over the corresponding experiment on the cluster attack dataset. hypothesis is that the true positive, false positive, true negative and false negative values are independent of the proposed video categories. For the category centric test, the x 2 's p-value is 0.00044 and Fisher's p-value is 0.00013. For the mixed data experiment, the x 2 's p-value is 0.0001166 and Fisher's p-value is 0.00015. For the novelty experiment, the x 2 's p-value is 0.01771 and Fisher's p-value is 0.00932. Thus, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the performance of CL-Vamos depends on the video motion category. Conclusion #2. While we expected that certain motion categories are easier to plagiarize, our results are surprising: CL-Vamos does not perform worst on categories 1 and 2, captured by a standing user with a stationary camera. Based on observations from our experiments, we believe that CL-Vamos exploits the ability of accelerometers to capture the small, involuntary hand shakes that occur during video capture sessions. Instead, CL-Vamos has high FPR values for the sandwich attack on categories 5, 6 and 11. This shows that in our experiments, humans are better at plagiarizing videos shot while scanning or following subjects.
Detection of the Perfect Mirror Attack. CL-Vamos achieved 100 percent accuracy when using either Random Forest, Decision Tree or MLP on the perfect mirror attack dataset. The reason is that the following features are consistently 0 for the fraudulent chunks: the DTW normalized alignment distance, the penalized cost, the normalized number of moves (expansion, contraction, match), and the normalized overlap. In addition, the calibration factor is always 1. We conclude that the perfection of this attack is also the reason for its failure.
Detection of the (i, p, c)-Mirror Attack. We have run the mixed experiment to evaluate the performance of CL-Vamos on the (i, p, c)-mirror attack datasets of Section 6.3. Table 9 shows the per-category performance of Vamos, that ranges between 80 and 100 percent.
Detection of the PFA Attack. We evaluated CL-Vamos against the PFA attack dataset in a manner different from the other attacks. Specifically, we have run 10 different experiments. In each experiment we have built a new PFA attack dataset: pick a new random dictionary membership, and a different set of 361 genuine and fraudulent chunks. Then, we ran 10-fold cross validation over each dataset. Table 10 shows the average results over the 10 experiments. While the Random Forest classifier performs best, all the classifiers tested with CL-Vamos achieved an accuracy exceeding 93 percent.
Conclusion #3. We have expected that the mirror attack and variants will be very effective against CL-Vamos. Instead, we discovered that a perfect match can be used by CL-Vamos to trivially detect fraud. Furthermore, CL-Vamos is effective even against mirror attack variants that introduce controlled perturbation to the match. Based on an analysis of the features produced by CL-Vamos, we conjecture that an observed accelerometer "inertia" is responsible for our success. Specifically, we observed that when the user stops moving the device, the video motion stream records this event, while the accelerometer continues to record unusually high readings. Similarly, when the device begins to move, unlike the video, the accelerometer experiences a delay in recording the motion. The difficulty to emulate this inertia, which we conjecture occurs throughout the motion of the device, enables the DTW features to effectively capture differences between genuine and fraudulent samples. The accuracy ranges between 63 percent (category 9) and 95 percent (category 8). The improvement is thus not consistent across all the video categories. Mixed Attack Evaluation. We have evaluated a scenario where CL-Vamos has knowledge of all the attacks. Specifically, we have used all the attack datasets, for a total of 401 cluster, 401 sandwich, 401 (i, p, c)-mirror and 10 Â 180 PFA attack instances. We have trained CL-Vamos on 90 percent of each of the attack datasets, as well as 90 percent of the 401 genuine instances. We have then tested CL-Vamos separately on the remaining 10 percent of attack instance of each attack, along with 90 percent of the genuine instances. To compensate for the 7 hold imbalance in the number of fraudulent versus genuine instances, we have assigned a penalty during training for incorrectly classifying fraudulent (1/8)) and genuine instances (7/8). Table 11 shows that with the exception of the sandwich attack, the knowledge of other attack instances greatly improves the TPR of CL-Vamos. The FPR increase is due to the imbalance between the number of fraudulent and genuine instances used during training.
Resilience to New Attacks. To investigate the ability of CL-Vamos to detect new, previously unseen attacks, we have performed the following experiment. For each attack type a we considered (cluster, sandwich, mirror variants), we trained CL-Vamos using all the fraudulent instances from all the attack datasets except a, as well as 80 percent of all the genuine chunks. We have then tested CL-Vamos on all the instances of the attack dataset of type a, and the remaining 20 percent genuine chunks. Table 12 shows the results. As expected, the performance of CL-Vamos degrades on all the attacks. In particular, for the sandwich attack, CL-Vamos achieves an overall accuracy of 33.88 percent. This result confirms the strength of the sandwich attack: in the absence of any sandwich attack training instances, CL-Vamos incorrectly accepts as genuine, more than 3 out of 4 fraudulent, sandwich chunks.
CL-Vamos versus Movee
We have compared the performance of CL-Vamos and Movee using the mixed data experiment, on the cluster and sandwich attack datasets. Fig. 9 
CL-Vamos on Citizen Journalism
Current YouTube videos do not have acceleration data. CL-Vamos however only works for video chunks for which we have acceleration data. We propose to use the classification of the collected YouTube videos (see Section 7.1) and the performance of CL-Vamos on the free-form video and acceleration samples (see Section 7.3) to predict its performance on fixed length chunks of citizen journalism videos from YouTube.
Let Accði; FreeForm; AT Þ denote the accuracy of CL-Vamos on videos from the ith category (i=1..11) of the free-form dataset, for a given attack type AT. We define the predicted accuracy of CL-Vamos for YouTube and the attack type AT, Acc p ðYouTube; AT Þ, as the weighted sum of its per-category accuracy on the free-form dataset:
Acc p ðYouTube; AT Þ ¼ P 11 i¼1 w i Â Accði; FreeForm; AT Þ. We define the weight w i to be the percentage of chunks of category i in the YouTube dataset, as shown in Fig. 6a . In the YouTube dataset categories 1 and 2 have the highest weight. The predicted accuracy of CL-Vamos for the cluster attack on the YouTube dataset is then 80.9 percent, and for the sandwich attack is 77.19 percent.
Vamos Evaluation
We now evaluate the performance of Vamos on entire video and acceleration samples. We note that a sample can consist of multiple chunks that belong to different motion categories. We have performed experiments using the stitch attack datasets (based on chunk-level cluster and sandwich attacks) described in Section 6.3. The stitch attack datasets consist of both genuine and fraudulent free-form samples.
Vamos makes the sample level classification decision based on the classification of the chunks of the sample. In The sandwich attack is effective: Without knowledge of sandwich attack instances, CL-Vamos performs poorly. order to avoid a case where the same chunk appears in both training and testing sets, we propose the following experimental design, illustrated in Fig. 10 . First, divide the dataset of 113 samples of at least 2 chunks each, into k folds, gen:foldðiÞ, i ¼ 1::k, and the corresponding 339 attack sample dataset (either cluster or sandwich attack based) into k folds, attack:foldðiÞ, i ¼ 1::k. The split takes place such that the samples from the gen:foldðiÞ were used to generate the attack samples from attack:foldðiÞ. Then, for each i ¼ 1::k, pick all the samples from gen:foldðjÞ and attack:foldðjÞ, j ¼ 1::k, j 6 ¼ i, and use their chunks to train CL-Vamos. Run the trained CL-Vamos on all the chunks from gen:foldðiÞ and attack:foldðiÞ. Given the classified chunks of the samples from gen:foldðiÞ and from attack:foldðiÞ, run the sample level classification step to classify the samples. For instance, to compute PrðS ¼ fakeÞ for a sample S, compute Prða i ¼ genuineÞ and Prða i ¼ fakeÞ based on the number of fake and genuine chunks in the training folds (see Section 5) . In our experiments, we set k to 10.
Experiment Results. Table 13 reports the performance of Vamos on the cluster based stitch attack dataset. We have experimented with multiple threshold values. For majority voting, a threshold of 0.1 performed best: both FPR and FNR values are under 9 percent. For the probabilistic approach, a threshold of 0.7 achieves similar performance. However, we note that the classifier approach, when using the Bagging algorithm, significantly outperforms the other solutions, with an FPR of around 5 percent and an FNR of 2.65 percent. Table 14 shows the performance of the majority voting, probabilistic and classifier based approaches of Vamos, on the sandwich based stitch attack dataset. For majority voting and probabilistic approaches, the sandwich based stitch attack is significantly more efficient: The majority voting has no threshold where both FPR and FNR are below 35 percent. The probabilistic approach achieves its optimum for a threshold of 0.8, when its FPR and FNR values are barely under 35 percent. In contrast, the classifier approach, again when using Bagging, exhibits a significantly improved performance, with an FPR of under 4 percent and an FNR of 16.3 percent. Fig. 11 summarizes the accuracy of the three approaches of Vamos for the cluster and sandwich based stitching attacks.
LIMITATIONS
Vamos needs access to inertial sensor data captured simultaneously with the video. This data is not uploaded by most live streaming apps. Vamos can however be integrated with other video and sensor data capture solutions, e.g., Focus [19] .
Vamos could benefit from the use of additional sensors, e.g., the gyroscope. We note however that Vamos achieves good accuracy even when leveraging only the accelerometer.
CONCLUSIONS
We proposed Vamos, the first length and motion unconstrained video liveness verification system, that uses the entire video and acceleration streams to identify video fraud. We proposed a suite of novel attacks that target acceleration based video liveness analysis solutions. Our evaluation, on data collected from a user study and on citizen journalism videos from YouTube, shows that Vamos accurately detects even complex attacks. In addition, we have introduced a motion based classification of videos, and have shown that the accuracy of Vamos depends on the video category. Neither of the majority voting and the probabilistic approaches simultaneously achieves small FPR and FNR values. The supervised learning approach significantly reduces both the FPR and FNR values. Fig. 11 . Vamos accuracy on stitch attacks. Even for the sandwich stitch attack, the classifier approach (using Bagging) exceeds 93 percent accuracy.
